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THE EFFECT OF THE GAULT DECISION ON THE
IOWA JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
Martin A. Freyt
On May 15, 1967, the United States Supreme Court decided Application
of Gault.' This case, the logical follow-up of Kent v. United States,2 has raised
great interest and concern in the area of juvenile justice.3 This article will
analyze the Gault decision as it affects the existing Iowa juvenile justice system.4
On Monday morning, June 8, 1964, as the result of a verbal complaint
registered by a Mrs. Cook, concerning a lewd telephone call made to her, Gerald
Gault was taken into custody by the sheriff of Gila County, Arizona, and
brought to the children's detention home. At the time Gerald was picked up,
his mother and father were both at work. No notice that he was being taken
into custody was left at the home nor were any other steps taken to advise them
that their son had, in effect, been arrested. When his mother returned home at
about 6 o'clock, Gerald's absence led her to inquire around the neighborhood.
There she learned that Gerald was in custody. She then went to the detention
home where Officer Flagg, the superintendent of the home and deputy proba-
tion officer, informed her "why Jerry was there" and that a hearing would be
held in Juvenile court at 3 o'clock the following day.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Technological College, B.S.M.E. 1962, Northwestern
University; J.D. 1965, Washington University; LL.M. 1966, George Washington University.-
Ed. I wish to thank Naomi S. Mercer, Senior law student, Drake University, for her skilled
assistance in field research.
1 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967).
2 383 U.S. 541 (1966). In Kent, the Supreme Court held that under D.C. CODE § 11-914
(1961), which permitted the juvenile court to waive jurisdiction to the district court after
"full investigation," the juvenile court must give the child, prior to entry of the waiver
order, an opportunity for a hearing on the waiver issue, that he is entitled to counsel in
connection with the waiver proceeding, that counsel be entitled to see the child's social
records, and that the court accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or
considerations sufficient to make appellate review meaningful. In Kent the Supreme Court
laid the basis for Gault by expressing concern that "the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care
and regenerative treatment postulated for children." Kent v. United States, supra at 556.
In retrospect the Supreme Court in Gault stated that its previous decisions in Kent v.
United States, supra, Haley v. Ohio, 332 US. 596 (1948), and Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962), "unmistakably indicate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." Application of Gault,
87 S. Ct. 1428, 1436 (1967).
3 Coxe, Lawyers in Juvenile Court, 13 CmaRi & DELN. 488 (1967); Lefstein, In re Gault,
Juvenile Courts and Lawyers, 53 A.BAJ. 811 (1967); Reynolds, In re Gault and the Alabama
Juvenile Courts, 28 ALA. LAW. 428 (1967); Rubin, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 16
CLEv.-MA a. L. Rxv. 477 (1967); Weinstein & Goodman, The Supreme Court and the Juvenile
Court, 13 CiuME & DELIN. 481 (1967); Comment, In Re Gault: Children Are People, 55 CALIF.
L. REv. 1204 (1967); Comment, Juvenile Justice in Transition, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 1144 (1967);
Comment, In re Gault: Understanding the Attorney's New Role, 12 Vu.. L. REv. 803 (1967);
20 VAND. L. REv. 1161 (1967).
4 The Iowa Juvenile Court was created in 1904 by ch. 11, [1904] Iowa Acts 9. In 1924, it
was changed by ch. 84, §§ 350-89, [1924] Iowa Acts 179 (codified as IowA CODE §§ S617-57(1924)) and remained in substantially this form through its recodification as IowA CODE§§ 232.1-.39 (1962). In 1965 this act was repealed and replaced by ch. 215, §§ 1-62, 67, [1965]
Iowa Acts 338-51 (codified as IowA CODE §§ 232.1-.62 (1966)). On June 12, 1967, this new chap-
ter was amended by 2 Iowa Leg. Serv. 159-63 (1967) (commonly referred to as Senate File 200).
Drake Law Review
On the hearing day, June 9, Officer Flagg filed a petition with the court
reciting only that "said minor is under the age of 18 years and in need of the
protection of this Honorable Court [and that] said minor is a delinquent
minor." The petition, which made no reference to any factual basis for the
delinquency action, was not served on the Gaults. At this hearing, Gerald, his
mother, and Officer Flagg appeared before the juvenile judge but neither
Gerald's father, who was at work out of the city, nor Mrs. Cook, the com-
plainant, was present. No one was sworn at this hearing. No transcript or re-
cording was made. No memorandum or record of the substance of the pro-
ceedings was prepared. At this hearing Gerald was questioned by the judge
about the telephone call. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge said he
would "think about it" and sent Gerald back to the detention home. Two or
three days later, without explanation, Gerald was released and driven home.
At 5 p.m. that evening, Mrs. Gault received a note on plain paper, not letter-
head, signed by Officer Flagg, which said:
"Mrs. Gault:
"Judge McGHEE has set Monday June 15, 1964 at 11:00
A.M. as the date and time for further Hearings on Gerald's
delinquency /s/ Flagg"
At the second hearing, Gerald, his father, mother, and Officer Flagg were
present before Judge McGhee. When Mrs. Gault requested that Mrs. Cook be
present, the judge responded that "she didn't have to be present at that hear-
ing." Officer Flagg filed a "referral report" with the court but its contents were
not disclosed to Gerald or his parents. It listed the charge as "Lewd Phone
Calls." At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge committed Gerald as a
delinquent to the state industrial school and entered an order which recited
that "after a full hearing and due deliberation the Court finds that said minor
is a delinquent child, and that said minor is of the age of 15 years."
Since Arizona law did not provide a right to appeal from a juvenile court
order, on August 3 Gerald's parents filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
with the Arizona Supreme Court. The petition was referred for hearing to the
Arizona Superior Court. On August 17, at the habeas corpus hearing, Judge
McGhee was called to testify because there was no transcript of the hearings
before his court. When asked under what sections of the code he found Gerald
delinquent, the judge concluded that he came within sections 8-201(6)(a) and
(d) of the Arizona Revised Statutes. Under section (a), which defined a delin-
quent child as one "who has violated a law of the state," the judge said that
Gerald was found to have violated Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-377 which
provided that a person who "in the presence of or hearing of any woman or
child . . .uses vulgar, abusive or obscene language, is guilty of a misde-
meanor ...... The judge also stated that Gerald violated section (d) which
defined a delinquent child as one who was "habitually involved in immoral
matters," because two years earlier a "referral" was made concerning Gerald
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"where the boy had stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied to the
Police Department about it." The judge testified that there was "no hearing"
and "no accusation" relating to this earlier incident "because of lack of mate-
rial foundation." He also testified that Gerald had admitted making other
nuisance phone calls in the past.
The superior court dismissed the writ and the Gaults appealed to the
Arizona Supreme Court, which affirmed the dismissal.5 The Gaults then
appealed to the United States Supreme Court contending that the Arizona
Juvenile Code was contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment in that it denied the following basic rights: (1) notice of the charges;
(2) right to counsel; (3) privilege against self-incrimination; (4) right to con-
frontation and cross-examination; and (5) right to appellate review and a
transcript of the proceedings. The Supreme Court, in reversing the Arizona
Supreme Court's affirmance of the dismissal of the writ, held that Gerald and
his parents were denied rights one through four. No ruling was made as to the
fifth.
I. NOTICE OF THE CHARGES
In Gault the Supreme Court held that for notice of the first hearing to
comply with due process: (1) the notice must be in writing; (2) it must be given
sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings to afford reasonable
opportunity to prepare an appearance; and (3) it must "set forth the alleged
misconduct with particularity." 6
A. Notice Must be in Writing
Mrs. Gault was orally informed by the superintendent of the detention
home of the reason Gerald was in custody and that a hearing would be held the
next afternoon. There was no written notice prior to the first hearing. This
procedure was in accordance with the Arizona Juvenile Code which did not
provide for notice of any sort to be given at the commencement of the pro-
ceedings to the child or his parent3 The Supreme Court held that to provide
due process the notice must be in writing.
The Iowa Code, in providing for summons and service of notice, stipulates
that each "shall recite briefly the substance of the petition or shall have attached
a copy of the petition." The implication is that both the notice and the
summons are written and not oral.8
5 Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965) (en banc).
6 The Court's decision on notice was expressly limited to the first hearing. Application
of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1446 (1967).
7 The only notice provision in the Arizona Juvenile Code was ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 8-224(a) (1956) which provided that if a person other than the parent or guardian was cited
to appear, the parent or guardian shall be notified "by personal service" of the time and
place of hearing.
8 The Iowa Code interrelates the provision for summons with that for notice. IOWA
CODE § 232.4 (1966) provides that the parents are summoned unless they voluntarily appear.
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B. Notice Must be Given at the Earliest Practicable Time
On the night of the day on which Gerald was taken into custody, Mrs.
Gault went to the detention home. There she learned only the reason Gerald
was in custody and that there would be a hearing the next afternoon. On the
hearing day, a petition was filed with the court but it was not served on or
shown to Gerald or his parents. 9 The Arizona Supreme Court held that a child
and his parents must be advised of the facts involved in the case no later than
the initial hearing. Then, if the charges are denied, they must be given a
reasonable period of time to prepare. In the Gault case, however, the Arizona
court held that, since Mrs. Gault was informed by the superintendent of the
detention home why Gerald was in custody, she knew the exact nature of the
charge against him before the hearing. The United States Supreme Court
rejected this as insufficient notice:
Notice, to comply with due process requirements, must be given
sufficiently in advance of scheduled court proceedings so that
reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded .... The "ini-
tial hearing" in the present case was a hearing on the merits.
Notice at that time is not timely; and even if there were a con-
ceivable purpose served by the deferral proposed by the court
below, it would have to yield to the requirements that the child
and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the specific
charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and
IOWA COnE § 232.5 (1966) states that they were served with notice if they are not summoned.
By reading the two together, the parents are served with notice only if they voluntarily
appear. The fact whether the information is delivered in the form of a "notice" or a
"summons" appears to make little difference. Both are required by statute to "recite briefly
the substance of the petition or shall have attached a copy of the petition." Therefore, both
comply with the Gault requirement that the pertinent information as to the specific issues
to be considered at the hearing are conveyed in writing to the interested parties.
The crucial question relates to the meaning of "voluntary appearance." If it refers to
presence at the juvenile court hearing, then it becomes inconsistent with IOWA CODE § 232.8
(1966), which provides "Service of notice or summons shall be made not less than five days
before the time fixed for the hearing." In addition, notice served on the parents when they
appear at the hearing would not constitute notice served in sufficient time in advance of the
proceedings to permit preparation as required by Gault. If a voluntary appearance refers
to the police station when the child is taken into custody or to intake, where the decision
is being made whether to formulate a petition, then it would be impossible to serve notice
which would "recite briefly the substance of the petition or shall have attached a copy of
the petition," because these procedural steps would precede the formulation of a "petition."
In order to be consistent with Gault, voluntary appearance, the distinguishing factor between
summons and notice, must be based on the cooperation of the parents prior to the filing
of the delinquency petition by the county attorney or probation officer with the clerk of thejuvenile court. IOWA CODE § 232.3 (1966). If the parents have voluntarily participated at the
police station and at intake, then the court must issue notice to the parents under section
232.5 and give them sufficient time to prepare for the specific issues which will be considered
at the hearing. If the parents have not voluntarily participated at the proceedings prior
to the filing of the petition, then the court must issue a summons under section 232.4 which
also must give them sufficient time to prepare.
9 The fact that no petition was served or supplied by the juvenile court appeared to
conflict with the Arizona Supreme Court's statement that the infant and his parent were to
receive a copy of the petition. Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760, 767 (1965).
The Arizona court attempted to excuse the juvenile court's failure to follow this procedure
by saying that Mrs. Gault knew the exact nature of the charge against Gerald before the
hearing and she failed to object to the procedural inconsistency at the hearing.
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that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time,
and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit
preparation.' 0
The Iowa Code provides, "Services of notice or summons shall be made not
less than five days before the time fixed for the hearing."" This raises the
question whether the minimum fixed time of five days is sufficient time in ad-
vance of the proceedings to reasonably prepare for the hearing. In most cases,
it would seem that it would be. However, in those cases which constitute the
exceptions, if the statute were construed to hold that five days notice would
constitute valid notice, the statute, under the Supreme Court's ruling, would
not comply with due process.' 2
C. Notice Must Specify the Alleged Misconduct with Particularity
The petition filed in the Arizona Juvenile Court recited only that Gerald
Gault "is a delinquent minor and that it is necessary that some order be made
by the Honorable Court for said minor's welfare." This conformed with the
Arizona Juvenile Code which provided:
The powers of the court may be exercised upon the filing of
a petition ... alleging that a child is ... delinquent, and needs
the care and protection of the court, without alleging the facts.'a
The United States Supreme Court held that the petition filed in this case
did not give the Gaults adequate notice. Notice, to comply with due process,
must "set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity." The Court noted
that the National Crime Commission observed that "the unfairness of too
much informality is ... reflected in the inadequacy of notice to parents and
juveniles about charges and hearings."'14 The child and his parents must be
notified of the specific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the
hearing so that they may meet these specific issues.
To the contention that the notice requirement was waived the Court said:
Mrs. Gault's "knowledge" of the charge against Gerald, and/or
the asserted failure to object, does not excuse the lack of adequate
10 Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1446 (1967).
11 IOWA CODE § 232.8 (1966). IOWA CODE § 232.10 (1962), the predecessor to the 1966 code,
also provided for at least five days notice before hearing.
12 Although this issue has never reached the Iowa Supreme Court in a delinquency set-
ting, it was considered in Stubbs v. Hammond, 257 Iowa 1071, 135 N.W.2d 540 (1965), an
action to declare a child dependent and neglected. The court held that the five day notice
minimum of IOWA CODE § 232.10 (1962) was insufficient to meet the basic requirement of
due process in the case of a nonresident parent whose whereabouts was known. The notice
given in Stubbs, although two days more than the statutory minimum, was not reasonably
calculated to reach the parent and afford him an opportunity to be heard. Compare Moore
v. Moore, 252 Iowa 404, 107 N.W.2d 97 (1961), with Stubbs v. Hammond, supra.
The existence of a statute which provides for a set number of days notice appears to
create a presumption that compliance with the statute constitutes sufficient notice. Thus the
burden is now on the parents and child to show that the statutory notice was not sufficient
instead of on the state to show that reasonable notice was given. This raises the question
whether this shift in presumption complies with the type of notice now required by Gault.
18 AsIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-222(b) (1956).
14 Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1446 n.52 (1967).
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notice. Indeed, one of the purposes of notice is to clarify the issues
to be considered, and as our discussion of the facts, supra, shows,
even the Juvenile Court Judge was uncertain as to the precise
issues determined at the two "hearings." Since the Gaults had no
counsel and were not told of their right to counsel, we cannot con-
sider their failure to object to the lack of constitutionally ade-
quate notice as a waiver of their rights.15
The Iowa Code provides that "The notice shall recite briefly the substance
of the petition or shall have attached a copy of the petition."16 The petition, in
turn, "shall set forth plainly: (1) the facts which bring the child within the
purview of this chapter."'17 In the past, the degree of specificity required in
Iowa to constitute adequate notice has varied from the petition which merely
repeated what the statute made an offense' 8 to the petition which described
to some detail the factual situation which was alleged to constitute the statutory
violation. 19 In light of the Gault requirement that the alleged misconduct be
15 Id. at 1447 n.54.
16 IowA CODE § 232.5 (1966).
17 IowA CODE § 232.3 (1966).
18 For example in State ex rel. Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952), the
petition alleged:
that Frank Breon under the age of 18 years * is a delinquent child, for that
the said Frank Breon as * * 0 petitioner is informed and believes is growing up
in idleness and crime, contrary to the statutes of the State of Iowa, in such cases
made and provided, and against the peace and welfare of the State of Iowa.
19 The petition used by the Polk County Juvenile Court takes the following form:
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF JUVENILE COURT:
Your petitioner, the Probation Officer for Polk County, Iowa, respectfully rep-
resents to your Honor that a child of about the age of
years residing at is dependent, neglected or delinquent within
the purview of the statutes of the State of Iowa relating to the care, guidance and
control of dependent, neglected and delinquent children in this, to-wit:
(State briefly facts relied on to sustain petition)
WHEREFORE this petitioner prays the Court to inquire into the alleged de-
pendency, neglect or delinquency of said child or children and of the truth of the
allegations herein made, in accordance with the statutes of the State of Iowa, and
make such order or orders in respect to said child Or children as may conduce to
his or their welfare and to the best interests of the State.
[Vol. 17
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set forth with particularity, notice which merely states that the child is delin-
quent because he violated a named statute would be insufficient. 20 Opportunity
to prepare requires a description of the facts which constitute the alleged viola-
tion. Thus the juvenile petition now appears to parallel the criminal charge.
Furthermore, past practices which termed the parent's appearance at the hear-
ing as a waiver of formal notice2x now also would be insufficient to constitute
the notice required for due process.
II. RIGr TO COUNSEL
The juvenile court in Gault did not advise the parents and their son of
their right to counsel but instead, in the absence of an express waiver of this
right to counsel, proceeded to hear, adjudicate and commit the child. This
procedure conformed to the Arizona Juvenile Code which provided for the
probation officer to represent the interests of the delinquent child in court.22
The United States Supreme Court excluded the probation officer from repre-
senting the child under the Arizona scheme because of his conflicting interests.
He could not act as arresting officer and witness against the child and then
represent him.2 3 The juvenile needed the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law,24 make skilled inquiry into the facts, 25 insist upon procedural
20 This was the form used in Ethridge v. Hildreth, 253 Iowa 855, 114 N.W.2d 311
(1962), where the petition alleged only that Ethridge was a "delinquent child by reason of
having committed the crime of forgery."
21 King v. Sears, 177 Iowa 163, 158 N.W. 513 (1916); De Kay v. Oliver, 161 Iowa 550,
143 N.W. 508 (1913).
22 ARMZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-204(c) (1956) provided:
The probation officer shall have the authority of a peace officer. He shall:
1. Look after the interests of neglected, delinquent and dependent children
of the county.
2. Make investigations and file petitions.
3. Be present in court when cases are heard concerning children and represent
their interests.
4. Furnish the court information and assistance as it may require.
5. Assist in the collection of sums ordered paid for the support of children.
6. Perform other acts ordered by the court.
Under the Arizona system, State Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 296 P.2d 298
(1956), held that the parents of an infant in a juvenile proceeding cannot be denied repre-
sentation by counsel of their choosing. The question then in Gault in regard to the parents
was whether they should be expressly notified of this right. In regard to the child, the ques-
tion was also whether he had a right to counsel separate from that of his parents.
23 The Court also excluded the judge from representing the interests of the child on
the basis of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
24 The Court pointed out that:
In the present proceedings, for example, although the Juvenile Judge believed that
Gerald's telephone conversation was within the condemnation of ARS § 13-377, he
suggested some uncertainty because the statute prohibits the use of vulgar language
"in the presence of or hearing of" a woman or child.
Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1448 n.58 (1967).
25 The factual issue of Gerald's role in the telephone episode was in question at the
hearing. Did Gerald make the lewd remarks or did he merely dial the number and hand
the phone to a friend?
December 1967]
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regularity,26 and ascertain whether the child had a defense and to prepare and
submit it. The Court concluded that:
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which
may result in commitment to an institution in which the juve-
nile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parent must be
notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained
by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will
be appointed to represent the child.27
The parents' knowledge that they could have employed and appeared with
counsel at the juvenile hearing did not constitute a waiver of a fully known
right.
[The parents and the child] had a right expressly to be advised
that they might retain counsel and to be confronted with the need
for specific consideration of whether they did or did not choose
to waive the right. If they were unable to afford to employ coun-
sel, they were entitled in view of the seriousness of the charge and
the potential commitment, to appointed counsel, unless they
chose waiver.28
Although the Iowa Code, as did the Arizona Code, provides for the proba-
tion officer to represent the interest of the child in court,29 the Iowa Code also
provides for counsel:
The child, parents, guardian, or custodian shall have the
right to [legal] counsel. If the minor, parents, guardian or cus-
todian desire but are unable to employ counsel, such counsel shall
be appointed by the court.30
The disjunctive "or" in the phrase "child, parents, guardian, or custodian"
permits statutory compliance when either the child or his parents have counsel.
Thus the child is not entitled to separate counsel.3 ' Gault, however, provides
26 Without counsel being present, the court was able to ignore the procedural provision
which required the petition to be served or supplied to the child and his parents. Application
of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1446 n.51 (1967).
27 Id. at 1451.
28 Id.
29 IOWA CODE § 231.10 (1966).
30 IOWA CODE § 232.28 (1966). The word "legal" was added to "counsel" by 2 Iowa Leg.
Serv. 159, 160 (1967). Prior to the enactment of ch. 215, § 29, [1965] Iowa Acts 345 (now IOWA
CODE § 232.28 (1966)), the right to counsel was controlled by IowA CODE § 232.15 (1962) and
its predecessors, § 3631 of the Codes of 1939, 1935, 1931, 1927 and 1924, Sections 232.15 and
3631, "Appointment to Represent Child," provided:
The court may, at any time after the filing of the petition, appoint an attorney
or other suitable person to represent and appear for said child.
The 1965 revision significantly changed representation by increasing the coverage to include
the representation of parents, guardians, and other custodians as well as children and by
making the appointment of counsel mandatory instead of permissive. The 1965 revision
combined with its 1967 amendment required counsel to be legally trained instead of per-
mitting the appointment of a layman.
81 Separate counsel would be of specific concern where there was conflict between the
child and his parents. For example where the child was charged with being a delinquent
under IowA CODE § 232.2(13)(c) (1966) because he was "uncontrolled by his parents, guardian,
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that both the child and his parents have individual rights to counsel. Therefore,
to be consistent, the "or" in the Iowa statute must be interpreted as the con-
junctive "and" so that both child and parent have this right.3 2
The Iowa Code also provides for notice of the right to counsel when a
summons is issued33 and when notice of the pendency of the case is served on
the parents.3 4 However, there is no provision for notice to the child nor any
definition as to what would constitute "an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment" of the right to counsel. 85
III. P~iviLEG AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
When Gerald was questioned at the juvenile court hearings by the judge,
he admitted making some of the lewd statements. 86 Neither Gerald nor his
parents were advised that he did not have to testify or make a statement or
that an incriminating statement might result in his commitment as a "delin-
quent." The Arizona Supreme Court, in rejecting the Gaults' contention that
Gerald had a right to be advised that he need not incriminate himself, replied:
or legal custodian by reason of being wayward or habitually disobedient," separate counsel
may help resolve this conflict by bringing its sources to the surface before the court.
32 This conflict could be avoided by reading the term "or" as conjunctive if the court
could say that by holding "or" disjunctive it would clearly be contrary to the legislative
intent. Ness v. H. M. Iltis Lumber Co., 256 Iowa 588, 128 N.W.2d 237 (1964); Lahn v. Incor-
porated Town of Primghar, 225 Iowa 686, 281 N.W. 214 (1938); 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTON § 4923 (3d ed. Horack 1943).
It is interesting to note that in both the summons and notice of hearing forms used by
the Polk County Juvenile Court the following paragraph appears:
You are further notified that the said child and his parents, guardian or cus-
todian have the right to legal counsel in this case and that if any of the said parties
desires but is unable to employ a lawyer one will be appointed by the Court upon
application made to Juvenile Court prior to said hearing. emphasis added)
This illustrates that this court has interpreted the statutory "21 or parent" as conjunctive
rather than disjunctive.
33 After a petition has been filed and unless the parties named in section 232.5
voluntarily appear, the court shall set a time for hearing and shall issue a summons
requiring the person who has custody or control of the child to appear with the
child before the court at a time and place stated. The summons shall recite briefly
the substance of the petition or shall have attached a copy of the petition and shall
give notification of the right to counsel provided for in section 232.28.
IOWA CODE § 232.4 (1966).
84 The court shall have notice of the pendency of the case and of the time and
place of the hearing served upon the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a
legitimate child or upon the mother, guardian, or legal custodian of an illegitimate
child if they are not summoned to appear as provided in section 232.4. The notice
shall recite briefly the substance of the petition or shall have attached a copy of
the petition and shall give notification of the right to counsel provided for in sec-
tion 232.28.
IOWA CODE § 232.5 (1966).
35 The practice in Polk County has been to have the probation officer advise the child
that he has a right to counsel. In a significant number of cases, the child and parents have
been represented by different counsel, especially when the parents have made the complaint.
36 Whether Gerald actually did make these admissions was open to question since there
was no record made during these hearings. The evidence whether these statements were
made had to be based on the conflicting testimony given at the habeas corpus proceedings
by the juvenile court judge, Mr. and Mrs. Gault, and the probation officer. The United States
Supreme Court assumed that Gerald admitted making "some of the lewd statements . . .
[but not] any of the more serious lewd statements."
December 1967)
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We think the necessary flexibility for individualized treatment
will be enhanced by a rule which does not require the judge to
advise the infant of a privilege against self-incrimination.37
The United States Supreme Court disagreed.
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related
to the question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admis-
sions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not
the mere fruits of fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions
of the truth. The roots of the privilege are, however, far deeper.
They tap the basic stream of religious and political principle
because the privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attorn-
ment to the state and-in a philosophical sense-insists upon
the equality of the individual and the State. In other words, the
privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the rule which pre-
vents the use of confessions which are the product of coercion
because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreli-
ability. One of its purposes is to prevent the State, whether by
force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind
and will of the person under investigation and depriving him of
the freedom to decide whether to assist the State in securing his
conviction.
It would indeed be surprising if the privilege against self-
incrimination were available to hardened criminals but not to
children. The language of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to
the States by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment, is un-
equivocal and without exception.38
87 Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760, 767-68 (1965).
8 Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1454 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
Against the application to juveniles of the right to silence, it is argued thatjuvenile proceedings are "civil" and not "criminal," and therefore the privilege
should not apply. It is true that the statement of the privilege in the Fifth Amend-
ment, which is applicable to the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment,
is that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." However, it is also clear that the availability of the privilege does not turn
upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature
of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites. The privilege may,
for example, be claimed in a civil or administrative proceeding, if the statement is
or may be inculpatory.
It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all state-
ments by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead to "criminal" involvement.
In the first place, juvenile proceedings to determine "delinquency," which may
lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for pur-
poses of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to
disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the "civil" label-of-con-
venience which has been attached to juvenile proceedings....
In addition, apart from the equivalence for this purpose of exposure to com-
mitment as a juvenile delinquent and exposure to imprisonment as an adult
offender, the fact of the matter is that there is little or no assurance in Arizona,
as in most if not all of the States, that a juvenile apprehended and interrogated
by the police or even by the juvenile court itself will remain outside of the reach
of adult courts as a consequence of the offense for which he has been taken into
custody. In Arizona, as in other States, provision is made for juvenile courts to
relinquish or waive jurisdiction to the ordinary criminal courts. In the present
case, when Gerald Gault was interrogated concerning violation of a section of the
Arizona Criminal Code, it could not be certain that the Juvenile Court Judge would
decide to "suspend" criminal prosecution in court for adults by proceeding to an
adjudication in Juvenile Court.
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As a result of this conclusion, an admission by a juvenile may not be used
against him in a delinquency proceeding unless there is clear and unequivocal
evidence that the admission was made with knowledge that he was not obliged
to speak and would not be penalized for remaining silent.89
The Iowa Code makes no reference to whether the privilege of self-
incrimination applies to juveniles. If this privilege was recognized in Iowa
before Gault, it must have been by case law; but, in the few delinquency cases
which have been appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court, the issue of self-
incrimination appears not to have been raised. Therefore, whether the juve-
nile was granted this privilege apparently has depended on the individual
juvenile judge before whom he appeared. After Gault, each judge must now
insure that the juvenile is extended his privilege against self-incrimination. 4°
It is also urged, as the Supreme Court of Arizona here asserted, that the juve-
nile and presumably his parents should not be advised of the juvenile's right to
silence because confession is good for the child as the commencement of the assumed
therapy of the juvenile court process, and he should be encouraged to assume an
attitude of trust and confidence toward the officials of the juvenile process. This
proposition has been subjected to widespread challenge on the basis of current re-
appraisals of the rhetoric and realities of the handling of juvenile offenders.
In fact, evidence is accumulating that confessions by juveniles do not aid in
"individualized treatment," as the court below put it, and that compelling the child
to answer questions, without warning or advice as to his right to remain silent, does
not serve this or any other good purpose. . . . [I]t seems probable that where chil-
dren are induced to confess by "paternal" urgings on the part of officials and the
confession is then followed by disciplinary action, the child's reaction is likely to
be hostile and adverse-the child may well feel that he has been led or tricked into
confession and that despite his confession, he is being punished.
Id. at 1455-56 (footnotes omitted).
89 The Court noted that:
[S]pecial problems may arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf
of children, and that there may well be some differences in technique-but not in
principle--depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence
of parents. The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, juvenile
courts and appellate tribunals in administering the privilege. If counsel is not present
for some permissible reason when an admission is obtained, the greatest care must
be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it
has not been coerced or suggested, but also that it is not the product of ignorance
of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.
Id. at 1458 (footnotes omitted).
40 Each officer of the Des Moines Police Department carries a "Miranda Card" which
he has been instructed to read to any suspected offender, including juveniles, before begin-
ning any questioning. The warning is printed on one side of a white 2" X 314" card:
MIRANDA WARNING
1. You have the right to remain silent.
2. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
3. You have the right to talk to a lawyer and have him present with you while
you are being questioned.
4. If you cannot afford to hire a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you
before any questioning, if you wish one.
On the reverse side of the card is:
WAIVER
After the warning and in order to secure a waiver, the following questions should
be asked and an affirmative reply secured to each question:
1. Do you understand each of these rights I have explained to you?
2. Having these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now?
At each hearing in Polk County Juvenile Court, after witnesses have been sworn and the
probation officer has told what the case is about, the judge then advises the parents and
December 1967)
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IV. CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION
In Gault, the juvenile judge rejected the parents' request that the com-
plainant, Mrs. Cook, be present at the delinquency hearing. Instead, Officer
Flagg, by hearsay testimony, presented the evidence of the offense. Although
there was an opportunity for the Gaults to cross-examine the officer, there was
no opportunity to cross-examine the complainant. The United States Supreme
Court held:
[A]bsent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency and
an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained
in the absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity
for cross-examination in accordance with our law and constitu-
tional requirements. 41
Although the Iowa Code provides the child and his parents with the right
to "question witnesses appearing at the hearing," 42 the scope of this right has
been limited by what witnesses are present at the hearing. For example, if the
factual situation of Gault had occurred in Iowa, it is questionable whether
the child and his parents would have been able to compel the juvenile court
to subpoena the complaining witness. The Iowa Code appears to make the
presence of this party discretionary with the court.43 Under the Supreme
Court's ruling in Gault, the subpoena of the complaining witness must be read
as mandatory in the absence of other evidence to support the complaint.
The Code, although providing that the "parent or guardian shall be
entitled to subpoena," omits any mention that the child also has this power.44
This becomes critical when the child and parent represent opposing interests.
In the light of the sweeping import of Gault, the child must also have this
right of confrontation.
the child of his Miranda rights at hearing. When the child is represented by counsel, which
at present is the usual case, the judge asks the lawyer if the child wishes to remain silent.
Upon a negative answer, the judge then asks the child if he wants to answer. Only once
has a child said no before Judge Tedrick of the Polk County Juvenile Court.
41 Application of Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1459 (1967).
42 IOWA CODE § 232.31 (1966):
The child and his parents, guardian, or custodian are entitled to be heard, to
present evidence material to the case, and to question witnesses appearing at the
hearing.
There is no similar provision in the 1962 code.
43 IowA CODE § 232.27 (1966), which describes the hearing, provides that "[t]he court
may require the presence of witnesses deemed necessary to the disposition of the petition."(emphasis added) This discretionary provision is made operative through the court's sub-
poena powers: (1) the subpoena against the person whose presence "in the opinion of the
court" is necessary at the hearing; and (2) the subpoena against the person whose attendance
as a witness is on behalf of the parent or child and at the request of the parent. IOWA CODE
§ 232.6 (1966). Although in the latter the issuance of the subpoena is mandatory, it may
not apply to the complaining party since his presence is not on "behalf of the parents or
the child" but on behalf of the state. Even if the complaining witness were called as a wit-
ness on the parent's or child's behalf, the parent and child would be bound by his witness'
statements and thus deprived of effective cross-examination. See 6 B. JONES, EVIDENCE §§ 2423-
33 (2d ed. 1926); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 38 (1954); 3 J. WiGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 896-918
(3d ed. 1940).
44 IowA CODE § 232.6 (1966).
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V. RIGHT TO APPELLATE REVIEW AND A TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Under Arizona law, since no appeal was permitted in juvenile cases, the
Arizona courts reasoned that there was also no necessity for nor right to a
transcript. Whether a transcript or other recording of the juvenile court hear-
ings was made was for the discretion of the juvenile court. In order to circum-
vent this lack of appeal, the Gaults petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus.
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court from the denial of their writ,
the Gaults contended that due process required: (1) the state to provide a right
to appellate review from a juvenile court order; (2) the state to provide a
transcript or recording of the hearings; and (3) the juvenile judge to state the
grounds for his conclusion.45 Although the Supreme Court refrained from
ruling on these issues, 46 it did state:
As the present case illustrates, the consequences of failure to pro-
vide an appeal, to record the proceedings, or to make findings or
state the grounds for the juvenile court's conclusion may be to
throw a burden upon the machinery for habeas corpus, to saddle
the reviewing process with the burden of attempting to recon-
struct a record, and to impose upon the juvenile judge the
unseemly duty of testifying under cross-examination as to the
events that transpired in the hearings before him.47
Although these three questions were not answered in Gault, it is not
unforeseeable that they will be raised again in the near future and answered
in the affirmative.
A. Appellate Review
The Iowa Code provides that:
An interested party aggrieved by any order or decree of the
[juvenile] court may appeal to the supreme court for review of
questions of law and fact.48
Although this provision was a recent addition to the juvenile code,49 the right
to appeal from a juvenile court order appeared to exist before the Code pro-
45 This issue was an attempt to extend Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966); which
held that the Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia must accompany its waiver order
with a statement of its reasons, to also require a statement of the reasons to accompany
delinquency findings and commitment orders.
46 The Court excused its failure to rule by saying: "In view of the fact that we must
reverse the Supreme Court of Arizona's affirmance of the dismissal of the writ of habeas
corpus for other reasons, we need not rule on this question . Application of Gault,
87 S. Ct. 1428, 1460 (1967).
47 Id. (footnotes omitted).
48 IOWA CODE § 232.58 (1966).
49 The appeal provision was adopted in the 1965 revision of the Iowa Juvenile Code,




vision.50 The exercise of this right has been rare.51 However, with the Gault
ruling that the child has a right to counsel, it is predictable that the increased
number of lawyers participating in juvenile court will be reflected not only
in a corresponding increase in the number of appeals but also in an increase
in new issues which are now clearly available through Gault.
B. Transcripts
The Iowa Code provides that:
Stenographic notes or mechanical recordings shall be re-
quired in all court hearings as in other civil cases unless the
parties waive the right to such records and the court so orders. 52
The 1967 amendments to the Code further provide that the juvenile, himself,
is not competent to waive but that his attorney or guardian ad litem could
waive for him.53 Therefore, since the Code provides for the making of tran-
script, this transcript should be available to the child for appeal.
C. Grounds for the Judge's Conclusions
The Iowa Code does not require the juvenile court judge to state the
grounds for his conclusion. At most, the Code provides for the statement of
conclusions. 54 To be consistent with future expansions of Kent v. United
50 This right to appeal was based on the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure for appeal for
a final judgment (IowA R. Civ. P. 331) and for appeal from an interlocutory order (IowA
R. CIv. P. 332). Under the Iowa rules, no permission to appeal a final judgment or decision
was required but permission by the Iowa Supreme Court or one of its members was neces-
sary in order to appeal from an interlocutory ruling or decision. The problem could then
arise, as it did in State v. Larson, 250 Iowa 818, 96 N.W.2d 325 (1959), whether the juvenile
court's "order and judgment" was interlocutory or final. In Larson, the juvenile court ordered
that the cause be continued during the child's good behavior until further order of the court
and that he be allowed to reside with his parents, that he be placed under the general super-
vision of the probation officer, and that he observe a 10 o'clock curfew, keep out of taverns,
pool halls and motor vehicles, abstain from intoxicating liquors, and refrain from fighting,
carrying weapons or associating with certain other boys. The Iowa Supreme Court dismissed
the appeal from the juvenile court order for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the order
was not final but interlocutory and no permission to appeal was granted.
Reading the Larson case in conjunction with IowA CODE § 232.58 (1966), the question
arises whether this new provision, which provides for appeal from any juvenile court order,
has enlarged this right to appeal over that which existed under the Iowa rules. That is,
if the Larson situation occurred today, the child may be able to appeal from the "inter-
locutory" order.
51 Within the last fifteen years only two attempts to appeal juvenile court delinquency
orders have been made. In 1952 a successful appeal was made from a charge of growing up
in idleness and crime. State ex rel. Shaw v. Breon, 244 Iowa 49, 55 N.W.2d 565 (1952). The
second case was State v. Larson, 250 Iowa 818, 96 N.W.2d 325 (1959). For a discussion of
Larson see note 50 supra.
52 IOWA CODE § 232.32 (1966).
53 2 Iowa Leg. Serv. 159, 160 (1967), amending IowA CODE § 232.32 (1966).
54 The court's finding with respect to neglect, dependency, and delinquency shall
be based upon clear and convincing evidence under the rules applicable to the trial
of civil cases, provided that relevant and material information of any nature in-
cluding that contained in reports, studies, or examinations may be admitted and
relied upon to the extent of its probative value. When information contained in
a report, study, or examination is admitted in evidence, the person making such
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States,55 the Code must be interpreted to require the juvenile judge to state
the grounds for his decision.
CONCLUSION
Weaknesses in the Iowa juvenile justice system occur not through direct
conflict between the Iowa Code and the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Gault but through omissions in the Code. By reading the Code in the
light of Gault, these omissions may be supplied so that the procedure would
not be in violation of due process of the fourteenth amendment. However,
without positive statements of these procedural elements, room for error exists.
In 1967 the Iowa legislature reconsidered the juvenile code. The results, except
in a few scattered instances,56 did not even approach the problems raised in
Gault. Therefore, the need still exists for a thorough reevaluation of the stat-
utory base for the Iowa system of juvenile justice.
a report, study, or examination shall be subject to both direct and cross examina-
tion when reasonably available.
2 Iowa Leg. Serv. 159, 160 (1967), amending IOWA CODE § 232.31 (1966). If the court finds
the child delinquent, IowA CODE § 232.34 (1966) enumerates the dispositions from which the
court may choose in entering its order.
5 383 US. 541 (1966).
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